FOOD
TERMINAL, INC., G.R. No. 153925
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
GARCIA, JJ.
Respondent. Promulgated:
August
10, 2006
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CORONA, J.:
The subject of this appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners
herein.
Petitioner
Food Terminal, Inc. (FTI) is the owner of a 10-hectare land known as the
Agro-Industrial Commercial Estate in Taguig, Metro
Manila. Petitioners Benito C. Salazar, Brenda Rivera and Samuel Namanama are the former President, Vice-President for
Finance and Senior Manager of the Legal Department, respectively, of FTI.
On
February 10, 1995, FTI entered into a 25-year lease contract with respondent
Shoppers Paradise FTI Corporation (Shoppers Paradise) for the establishment of
a commercial mall complex and other allied businesses acceptable to FTI. The
parties agreed that the area would be turned over to respondent in five tranches free from any occupants or structures. The pertinent provisions of their contract
were the following:
1.
Area Leased
1.1
xxx xxx xxx
Given the purpose of leasing said premises, this lease is understood to be a single indivisible lease over the whole area and not a divisible lease for each lot.
1.2
The leased
premises shall be turned over to the LESSEE free and clear of any occupants and
structures. Since the whole area is not ready for delivery and since it is not
possible to undertake project construction over the whole area all at the same
time, the turn over of the leased premises shall be done in tranches
according to a mutually-agreed [schedule.]
The ten (10) hectare area divided
into several tranches are the following:
FTI’s
description Shopper’s Description
a) Tranche
1: Lot 32 (16,204 sq.m.) Lot 1
b) Tranche
2: Lot 34 (33,840 sq.m.) Lots 7 and 8
Portion of FTI Ave.
(5,400 sq.m.) Lot
6
Portion of Lot 36 (3,593
sq.m.) Lot
9
c) Tranche
3: Lot 31 (8,400 sq.m.) Lot 2
Portion of Palayan Road (7,414 sq.m.) Lot 4
d) Tranche
4 Lot 33 (10,685 sq.m.) Lot 3
Portion of Palayan Road (8,014 sq.m.) Lot
5
e) Tranche
5: Portion of Lot 35 & Lot 36
(15,133 sq.m.) Lot 9[2]
In June 1995, FTI turned over Tranche 1 and some portions of Tranche
2 to Shoppers Paradise. Lot 36 of Tranche 2, which
was about 3,593.10 sq.m., was then being occupied by Metro Manila Transit
Corporation (MMTC). Tranches 3, 4 and 5 were not
delivered. Later, respondent proposed a novation of
the lease contract to limit the leased area to Tranche
1. FTI refused since respondent had already taken over the former MMTC-occupied
area of Tranche 2 by then.
In the meantime, while the turn over of Tranche 3 was being negotiated, FTI sent to respondent statements of account covering the lease rentals of Tranche 2. Instead of paying the rentals, however, respondent requested a meeting with FTI for the reconciliation of its accounts since it had allegedly made previous payments on the area previously occupied by MMTC. The meeting, however, did not push through.
In 1999, FTI, through petitioner
Samuel Namanama, demanded payment of unpaid rentals
from respondent, threatening to terminate the lease agreement and padlock or repossess
the leased area if payment was not made. Respondent informed FTI that it had
already fully paid and updated its rental payments until year 2000 although it
debited therefrom its previous payments on Tranche 2.
Respondent filed a complaint against
petitioners for “Breach of Contract, Specific Performance, Injunction with
Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction”[3]
in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 261.[4]
This was docketed as Civil Case No. 67740.
In the complaint, respondent
contended that petitioners violated their agreement as they did not disclose
that MMTC was occupying a portion of Tranche 2. It
claimed that petitioners were demanding payment which was not due on account of
the incomplete and defective turn over of Tranche 2. FTI’s threat to terminate the lease contract and to padlock
or repossess the leased premises allegedly constituted a serious disturbance of
its rights under their contract.
In their answer, petitioners denied respondent’s
allegations. According to them, respondent was aware that MMTC was still
occupying a portion of Tranche 2 when it entered into
the lease contract. They argued that, in any event, respondent was able to take
possession of the area immediately after MMTC vacated it.
On January 17, 2000, Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio, presiding judge of Branch 261 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, issued the TRO prayed for by
respondent. The order read:
WHEREFORE, a temporary restraining order is hereby
issued enjoining defendants FTI, Benito Salazar, Samuel Namanama
and Brenda Rivera from padlocking and repossessing the subject leased premises
at the FTI Complex in the Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila.
Meantime, set the case for hearing on the application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on January 26, 2000 at
8:30 a.m.
SO ORDERED.[5]
While the parties’ respective statements of account were undergoing reconciliation, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued the writ of preliminary injunction on February 14, 2000. She ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
After a thorough and close examination of the
aggregate oral and documentary evidence respectively presented and adduced by
the parties which appear to be in direct conflict with each other and to
prevent serious damage that they may be sustained...and so as not to render the
judgment in this case moot and ineffectual, it is but fair that for the time
being, defendants’ threat of terminating the lease contract and padlocking and
repossessing the leased premises be enjoined until the case is finally settled
on the merits.
WHEREFORE,
upon filing a bond of P2,400,000.00, let a writ of preliminary
injunction issue ordering the defendants, FTI, Benito Salazar, Samuel Namanama, Brenda Rivera and other persons acting for and on
their behalf, to desist and refrain from terminating the lease contract and
padlocking and repossessing the subject
leased premises until the case is finally decided on the merits.[6]
Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or injunction and inhibition to set aside
the above order of Judge Reyes-Carpio. They imputed
grave abuse of discretion on her part for granting the injunction in favor of
respondent despite the latter’s failure to establish a clear, existing and
unmistakable right to it. Petitioners also contended that Judge Reyes-Carpio was biased and partial against them, thus, she
should have inhibited herself from trying the case. Lastly, they prayed that a
TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the proceedings in
the court a quo.
On
February 11, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.[7]
It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Reyes-Carpio in issuing the writ. According to the CA, petitioners failed to
prove her partiality and bias against them, hence, she could not be ordered to
inhibit herself from hearing the case. It held:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.[8]
Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration but it was denied, thus, this petition.[9]
Petitioners attack the decision of
the CA finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of Judge Reyes-Carpio in granting
injunctive relief to respondent.[10]
Petitioners argue that, for a writ of preliminary injunction to validly issue, the existence of a clear and positive right calling for judicial protection must first be established. They insist that there was nothing in the orders of the judge which sustained respondent’s accusation that petitioners violated the provisions of the lease contract. She did not even make any categorical pronouncement on what specific rights (of respondent) were violated so as to warrant the issuance of the writ of injunction. Therefore, she should have recused herself from the case for being prejudiced against them.
We affirm the decision of the CA.
To
sustain imputations of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction against Judge Reyes-Carpio, petitioners
should have presented evidence that the latter’s issuance of the assailed writ
of preliminary injunction was capricious, whimsical, despotic or arbitrary.[11]
Both the trial court and the appellate court found no trace of any of these on
the part of the trial judge. The CA even held that the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction was not “bereft of findings by the trial court of the
right of Shoppers Paradise to the injunctive relief.”[12]
It likewise held that, under the lease contract, respondent had a clear and
unmistakable legal right to the disputed premises threatened to be padlocked or
repossessed by petitioners.
The
foregoing conclusions are binding on us pursuant to the long-settled doctrine
that this Court will not review issues of fact if the trial court’s and the
appellate court’s findings jibe.[13]
At
any rate, Judge Reyes-Carpio could not be expected to
make a categorical pronouncement as to whether or not there was an actual
breach or violation of the lease contract by petitioners inasmuch as that was
still the issue to be decided in the main case and a full-blown trial was
necessary to resolve it.
The writ of preliminary injunction is
issued by the trial court to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.[14]
Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case can be heard fully.[15]
To warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ, all that is necessary is for the
party seeking it to show that injurious consequences will result if the writ is
not issued.[16]
In this case, pending the final determination of their conflicting claims, the
trial court deemed it best to issue the assailed writ to avert any deleterious
effect (of padlocking or repossessing) on both parties’ interests under the
lease contract.
On
Judge Reyes-Carpio’s alleged bias and partiality, we
find no proof to sustain this accusation. Therefore, there is no cogent basis
for us to order her to desist from further presiding over the case. To
disqualify a judge on the ground of bias or prejudice, the movant
must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence.[17]
Mere suspicion that a judge is unfair to a party is not enough as there should
be adequate evidence to prove that charge.[18]
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZAssociate
Justice
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
|
CANCIO C. GARCIA
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
* Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio, in her official capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 261, was impleaded as a respondent. However, the Court excluded her pursuant to Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
[1] Penned by Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola (retired) and Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired), Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 40-47.
[2] Id., pp. 41-42.
[3] Annex “U,” id., p. 96.
[4] Presided by Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio.
[5] Annex “V,” id., pp. 115-116.
[6] Annex “X,” id., pp. 137-140.
[7] Supra note 1.
[8] Rollo, p. 47.
[9] CA Resolution, id., p. 57.
[10] Petition, id., p. 27.
[11] Villareal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107314, 17 September 1998, 295 SCRA 511; Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126405, 25 February 1999, 303 SCRA 679.
[12] Rollo, p. 46.
[13] Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 137 (2001).
[14] Heirs of Joaquin Asuncion v. Gervacio, Jr., G.R. No. 115741, 9 March 1999, 304 SCRA 322.
[15] Defensor-Santiago, Rules of Court Annotated, Second Revised Edition 2002 quoting Heirs of Joaquin Asuncion v. Gervacio, id.
[16] Unionbank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 837 (1999).
[17] Webb v. People, 342 Phil. 206 (1997).
[18] Zamudio v. Peña, 350 Phil. 1 (1998).